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I. INTRODUCTION
Is there a moral right to freedom of conscience?  Should a legal right
to freedom of conscience be established in each country on Earth?  This 
essay argues for negative answers to both questions.1 
* Professor Above Scale (Distinguished Professor), Department of Philosophy,
University of California, San Diego. 
1. It should not be assumed these questions are nested—that the legal right should
be established if there is such a moral right, or only if there is such a moral right, or if and only 
if there is such a moral right.  In my view, the questions are separate and independent because
we should favor establishing some legal rights that do not correspond to any matching 
moral rights, and we should recognize some moral rights yet refrain from establishing 
them as legal rights.  Although pondering what moral rights there are is an inquiry distinct
from pondering what legal rights there should be, in the present case these inquiries 
arrive at similar conclusions: in my view, there is no moral right to freedom of conscience, 
and we should not establish any such legal right. 
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The term freedom of conscience might refer to freedom of thought and
the freedom of expression that sustains freedom of thought.  In this sense 
we might affirm the right of each person to form individual opinions
about the right and the good, about what we owe one another by way of
due consideration of others, and about what is worthy of pursuit in life, 
on the basis of free discussion of these matters.  In the present discussion, 
these freedoms, important as they might be, are not under consideration.
Let us assume freedom of thought and expression are secured.  The
status of freedom of conscience in the sense that is our concern in this
discussion is still wide open. 
The right to freedom of conscience at issue here is what Michael Perry
has called the “right to moral freedom.”2  He characterizes this as the 
right “to live one’s life in harmony with one’s moral convictions and
commitments,” and he interprets “moral” convictions and commitments 
broadly as ones that 
are the yield of one’s conscientious effort to discern what sort of person one 
should be—and what sort of life, therefore, one should live—especially in 
relation to other persons; in particular, moral convictions and commitments are
the yield of one’s conscientious effort to discern what choices are, for oneself if 
not for everyone, and all things considered, right rather than wrong, just rather
than unjust, good rather than bad, or the like.3 
More needs to be said to pinpoint what is at issue here.  Taken one 
way, one can always live one’s life fully in harmony with one’s moral 
convictions and commitments—no matter what circumstances one faces 
and no matter what one’s convictions are.4  Of the acts available for 
choice at a time, one can always choose the one that best fulfills one’s 
moral convictions, the act that, in the circumstances, is what conscience 
tells one that one ought to do.5  Given the choice of renouncing one’s
2. Michael J. Perry, From Religious Freedom to Moral Freedom, 47 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 993, 996 (2010). 
3. Id.
4. This claim is literally correct only for moral judgments about what one ought 
to do that accept an “ought implies can” constraint.  If conscience tells a person she must
complete a pilgrimage to Mecca in her lifetime, come what may, then she can fulfill the
demand of conscience only if she has the resources and opportunity to do the required
act.
5. The claim here is that one can always act in conformity with one’s conscience, 
so one always has the opportunity to do that.  Someone might deny this claim on the 
ground that one might be unable to do what one has the opportunity to do.  My response
is that if it is thought that one has the opportunity to do what is morally right but one is 
unable to act in this way, then the “ought implies can” principle is always triggered, and 
the supposedly morally required act that one is unable to do must be regarded as outside 
the set of acts eligible for choice and hence, not all things considered, the act that is 
really morally required. 
1016
ARNESON FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/29/2010 10:25 AM      
  





















[VOL. 47:  1015, 2010] Against Freedom of Conscience 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
faith or being burned at the stake, if one’s conscience says one ought not 
renounce one’s faith, one can refrain from renouncing.  One’s subsequent 
life will be short, but it will be a life lived in full harmony with one’s 
moral convictions.  Call this a “life of integrity.”  If one always necessarily 
has the opportunity to lead such a life, it makes no sense to hold that one 
has a right to live such a life, a right with corresponding duties on the 
part of other people to safeguard the opportunity.  The right to moral 
freedom has to be a right to something more than the opportunity for a 
life of integrity. 
In broad outline the “something more” is easy to discern.  If one’s 
conscience says one ought to farm the land and if one has a right to 
moral freedom, then one has a right to freedom to farm the land.  There 
may be many conditions that must be fulfilled for it to be the case that
one has this freedom, but as advocates interpret it, the right to moral
freedom specifically protects one against certain forms of interference.6 
The right is construed as negative, not positive.  I do not lack freedom to
farm the land just because I lack farming ability or the resources to
purchase a farm or the resources to move to an agricultural region where
farming jobs are available, but I do lack the freedom if, for example,
vigilantes threaten credibly that if I farm the land, then they will attack
my family, or no one will hire me for farm work or sell me farmland 
because of my religion or ethnicity or race, or the state prohibits me,
along with everyone else, from working the available land suitable for 
farming in order to preserve the environment for future generations, and 
so on.  In this essay I shall focus on the right to moral freedom regarded
in its aspect of protection from state action that restricts one’s freedom to
live according to one’s moral convictions. 
A law or official action by a state official that restricts one’s liberty to 
live in harmony with one’s conscience would be a burden on the free 
exercise of conscience.  Such a burden would not count as a violation of 
the right to freedom of conscience if the law or public policy or official 
action in question is “necessary to serve a legitimate government
interest.”7  So interpreted, the right to freedom of conscience is not 
absolute and exceptionless.  It is one right to be balanced against others. 
6. In Part IV of this essay, I suggest that this is not the best construction of the 
right in question.  See infra text accompanying notes 19–20. 
 7. Perry, supra note 2, at 1008. 
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We are to put a heavy thumb on the scale, not an infinitely large weight,
in favor of freedom of conscience. 
The idea of a right to freedom of conscience so interpreted might 
sound admirable and high-minded, but to my mind, it merits firm 
rejection.  The right to freedom of conscience is unacceptable both at the 
level of abstract moral principle and at the level of practical policy—the
level of moral thinking at which we try to discern what laws, social
norms, public morality, and constitutional guidelines there should be. 
II. THE RIGHT AGAINST CONSCIENCE
The simplest way to see the flaws in the idea of a right to freedom of
conscience is to notice that in a well-functioning, tolerably just democratic 
society, there is a moral right on the part of those who cooperate together 
to establish and sustain the rule of law by generally obeying the laws, 
even those offensive to conscience, that those who benefit from their 
submission should do the same.  In short, there is a moral right against
freedom of conscience.
The basis of this right against conscience is that people tend to have
substantially different and opposed convictions about the right and the 
good.  These disagreements are perhaps especially pronounced, or at 
least especially well-articulated, in a diverse, modern society with wide
freedom of speech and action.  Despite these disagreements, there are 
great benefits to coordinating behavior by general compliance with a set
of laws that is enforced uniformly on all members of society by the state. 
Given an ongoing society with a particular array of sets of moral beliefs
held by the various members, there are many legal codes that might be 
enforced such that the results of general conformity to the code would be 
superior from each person’s moral standpoint than no enforcement of
any code.  Some of these possible codes would still be morally unsavory.
We could instead imagine a set of legal codes, enforcement of any of 
which would be better than no agreement from every reasonable person’s
moral standpoint.  Reasonable here means “reasonable enough”; it is a 
vague standard that prevents a legal code from being admissible because 
it is opposed by some person’s uncontroversially unacceptable moral
beliefs.8 
8. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 48–50 (1993) (discussing the notion 
of reasonable disagreement on the content of public morality among citizens in modern
democracies).
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Now suppose one of these admissible codes is in place.9  Some portion 
of the code, let us say, is offensive to the conscience of each person in 
the society who lives under the jurisdiction of the code.  Understanding
the situation just described, including especially the point that everyone
finds general compliance with this code better from her own standpoint 
rather than general noncompliance, the other members of society comply
with the laws in order to gain the benefits of a good rule of law for all. 
Given the facts as described, one has a moral duty, in fairness to the 
cooperating others, to comply with laws, even a law that is obnoxious to 
one’s own conscience, up to a point.  This is an implication of the Hart-
Rawls principle of fairness in the setting of moral disagreement combined 
with benefits for all that arise from everybody’s subordinating her private
judgment to the general will provided others are doing the same.10 
The principle of fair play arising from the Hart-Rawls principle of 
fairness generates duties simply in virtue of the cooperating behavior of 
others, directed toward producing benefits for all including oneself, and
thus triggering a reciprocal duty to do likewise.  The process by which
the laws arise does not per se matter so far as the principle of fair play is 
concerned.  The duty is amplified if the set of laws around which 
cooperation pivots is selected by a reasonably fair democratic process. 
Other citizens have sacrificed in becoming well-informed voters who 
9. At this point I am assuming that cooperation to sustain any admissible legal 
code can trigger a duty owed by beneficiaries of the cooperation to the cooperators to
cooperate in turn.  Eventually I challenge this assumption. Some legal codes are substantially
unfair in their distribution of the benefits and burdens that flow from establishing and 
sustaining compliance with the code in a society.  Cooperation to secure compliance with
an unfair code does not trigger a duty of reciprocity on the part of the beneficiaries of 
this cooperation.  Correcting this assumption does not unsettle the argument I am making
in this section.
10. The Hart-Rawls principle of fairness holds that: 
[W]hen a number of persons engage in a just, mutually advantageous, cooperative
venture according to rules and thus restrain their liberty in ways necessary to 
yield advantages for all, those who have submitted to these restrictions have a 
right to similar acquiescence on the part of those who have benefited from 
their submission. 
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 90 (1974). There is a large literature on
this topic. See, e.g., A. JOHN SIMMONS, Fair Play and Political Obligation: Twenty Years 
Later, in JUSTIFICATION AND LEGITIMACY: ESSAYS ON RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS 27, 27– 
42 (2001); A. JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS 101–42
(1979).  For a defense of the principle of fairness, see generally Richard J. Arneson, The 
Principle of Fairness and Free-Rider Problems, 92 ETHICS 616 (1982); Richard J.
Arneson, Doubting and Defending the Principle of Fairness (Sept. 29, 2010) (unpublished
essay) (on file with author).
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have voted conscientiously for the general good as they see it.  That is, 
let us suppose a fair process in which one has an equal, democratic say. 
The fact that fellow citizens have cooperated together to produce the 
laws as well as to sustain them by their obedience once they are enacted
generates a fair-play obligation to participate in the democratic process
and a further obligation to comply with laws that have this morally
desirable pedigree, even when the laws are obnoxious to one’s conscience. 
This further obligation to subordinate one’s private, conscientious 
judgment and comply with laws, even those that one conscientiously
opposes, has an epistemic component.  After all, what the majority of
one’s fellow citizens supports might be right even though one’s present
opinion is that the majority’s will has embraced what is wrong.  But 
even setting this possibility to the side, in a society in which democratic 
citizens generally subordinate their private judgment, up to a point, and 
defer in their conduct to legal requirements established by a fair majority 
rule process, one has a moral duty as a democratic citizen to do the 
11 same. 
The fact that the individual citizen has a moral duty to comply with 
the duly enacted laws even against her conscience is compatible with the 
possibility that one’s fellow citizens also have a duty to induce the 
government not to require compliance against conscience but to 
subordinate legal requirements to individual conscience.  The situation 
could be comparable to one in which, as host, you are obligated to offer 
the last piece of cake to the guest, but as the discerning guest I am
morally obligated to notice your ravenous hunger and decline the offer. 
However, I shall argue that this is not actually the case.  The next section 
of this essay addresses the issue. 
There is an ambiguity here in the notion of being conscientiously
opposed to a legal requirement.  One might be conscientiously opposed
to a legal requirement—believes that it is wrong and that it ought not to
be imposed on anyone—but also believe that, all things considered,
given it is a legal requirement, one morally ought to comply with it.  In
this case, in a sense, one’s conscience opposes compliance and in 
another sense supports compliance.  Another possibility is that one is 
conscientiously opposed to a legal requirement—believes that it is wrong 
and ought not to be imposed on anyone—and also believes that, all 
things considered, even though it is a legal requirement, one in conscience
ought not to obey.  The right to freedom of conscience might be construed
11. See DAVID M. ESTLUND, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK
117–58 (2008) (discussing the moral authority of democratic decisionmaking). 
1020
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in a broad way, covering both possibilities, or in a narrow way, covering
just the second.
The right against freedom of conscience and the duty to subordinate
one’s private judgment to established legal requirements in a tolerably 
just political order hold only up to a point.  If state officials order one to 
kill an innocent, nonthreatening person for no good reason, in accordance
with existing laws, one surely ought not to do so, even if this is a
tolerably just political order and the odd command an aberration.  The 
same goes for many other legal requirements that might confront the 
individual with a stark choice between obeying the law and following
one’s conscience.  In this case, because the majority of citizens has no
right to authorize this command, it obviously has no moral right that you 
obey the command and no right to compel you to obey it.  In other cases,
in which individual conscience has gone awry, the fact that the individual, 
from an epistemic, standpoint will reasonably think she has no duty to 
comply with a legal requirement is fully compatible with state officials’ 
acting rightly in forcing compliance.  If there are good and sufficient 
reasons to establish a legal requirement, there is a strong presumption in
favor of enforcing the legal requirement evenhandedly against all 
citizens, including those with some disposition against compliance.
This presumption can be overridden.  Laws are blunt instruments of 
social control, and in the nature of the case, even an ideal law that is
properly designed can end up constraining individuals sometimes when 
the morally right choice for the individual is to violate the law’s
requirements.12  Trying to write a theoretically perfect law that in every 
application issued directives to those subject to its authority that exactly
matched what all things considered they morally ought to do would be a 
misguided venture.  The effort would result in a law that was either too 
complicated to function as a good law at all or too vague in its
provisions to guide conduct effectively even in the standard situations
that warrant having any legal requirement in this domain.  The conflict 
between the requirements even of ideal law as they fall on individuals in
some circumstances and the requirements of morality as they determine
what the individual really ought to do in those circumstances is just a 
fact of life, not to be deplored or teased into paradox.  However, given 
the conflict, an ideal administration of law should perhaps have some 
12. On this theme, see generally LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE
OF RULES: MORALITY, RULES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW (2001). 
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flexibility built into it.  It might be the case that state officials should 
have discretion to decline to enforce the clear requirements of law as
they apply to some individuals in extreme circumstances—in which
violating the law is objectively the right thing to do.  Sometimes police
ought to look the other way and decline to arrest, and if an arrest is 
made, sometimes public prosecutors ought to decline to prosecute, and if 
a prosecution goes forward, sometimes judges should twist and 
manipulate the law to avoid a conviction, and if a trial goes forward to 
the jury with the evidence clearly favoring a guilty verdict, sometimes 
juries should decline to convict.  However, the question whether state 
officials should sometimes relax the enforcement of a law in circumstances 
in which disobedience to law would be objectively morally right is 
obviously different from the question whether an individual’s belief that 
“noncompliance with a law is what morality demands” is by itself sufficient 
to generate an argument that the individual should be exempted from the 
legal requirement to comply. 
III. FAIR DISTRIBUTION OF THE BURDENS OF COMPLIANCE   
WITH LEGAL REQUIREMENTS
The claim that there is a right against conscience as described here is 
consistent with the idea that there is a right to freedom of conscience as
advocated by Perry.  The argument for the right against conscience is an
application of the Hart-Rawls principle of fairness.  Cooperators who 
acquire rights against others who benefit from their cooperation according 
to this principle do so only provided that the cooperative scheme in play
is fair in its distribution of the benefits and burdens of cooperation.  For 
all that has been said, perhaps a necessary condition for meeting this 
fairness test here is that the legal order respects a prior right of conscience. 
Recall that the Perry right of conscience requires that one be left free to 
act on one’s conscientious judgment concerning what one morally ought
to do or what would be morally desirable to do unless state restriction is
“necessary to secure a legitimate government interest.”13 
Although the claim that a right of conscience must be fulfilled before 
the right against conscience can arise is logically possible, it is highly 
implausible.  In brief, the argument supporting this claim of implausibility
is that what triggers a sound moral claim that the law is unfairly
burdensome and that one should be relieved from its requirements is that 
the disadvantage one suffers from the imposition of the law is
 13. Perry, supra note 2, at 1008. 
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disproportionate to the advantage to society that the imposition of the 
law achieves.  There are many types of advantages and disadvantages 
that may figure in the determination of disproportionality.  That compliance
with law would prevent one from complying with one’s conscientious 
judgment about what one ought to do is not necessarily a disadvantage at
all, and certainly not a disadvantage that trumps all others.  Affirming a 
right to freedom of conscience in effect gives a special privilege to one 
particular type of claim among others that might be made to buttress a 
claim that a particular law is unfairly burdensome in its application to 
oneself and the law should either be revised to remove this burden, or
that by administrative decree one should be exempted from the
requirement to comply with the law on the books. Accordingly this
special privilege to claims of conscience would be unfair—a form of
wrongful discrimination. 
In many situations, when the state enacts a law that regulates or 
restricts a type of activity, compliance is more onerous for some people 
than others.  A law that prohibits driving motorboats after dark is more
burdensome on people who want to engage in that activity than on 
people who have no such desire.  Still, it might serve the public interest 
to have such a law.  We can further pick out a class of people who are
unfortunately burdened by the law.  Suppose the law aims at preventing
boating accidents.  Some people are especially safe drivers of motorboats
after dark, so restricting them does not do much to advance the law’s 
purpose, and some people have especially strong interests in driving 
motorboats after dark, and some people fit both descriptions to a degree. 
For some of these especially burdened people, if it were administratively 
feasible to craft the law so as not to target them or if it were administratively 
feasible to exempt them from the requirement of compliance, it would be 
morally desirable, all things considered, to do so.  Call these people the 
“unfortunately burdened.”  Here it is intended that the idea of
“administrative unfeasibility” is stretched to include the situation in 
which several groups of people have a case for accommodation such that
it would be morally desirable to accommodate some of these people but 
morally undesirable to accommodate all—the fulfillment of the state’s 
legitimate purposes would drop excessively if all were accommodated— 
and in addition, there is no morally nonarbitrary basis for discriminating
among the unfortunately burdened to accommodate some but not others. 
Moreover, if it is administratively feasible to limit the law’s reach in
some way so that these people or some subset of them are left free to
 1023


























drive motorboats after dark and this limitation is morally desirable, then 
the people who should be left free in this way are unduly burdened by
the law. 
Other things being equal, it is morally desirable to accommodate those
who are unfortunately burdened by legal requirements by eliminating the 
burden.  This might be done by substituting an alternate law that does 
not restrict the liberty of some unfortunately burdened people or 
equivalently by leaving the law as it stands but exempting some class of
unfortunately burdened people from the legal requirement to comply.
Accommodations of this sort might conceivably be costless for those 
who still must comply with the law—given that the law is going to apply
to me and restrict my liberty, no further costs are imposed on me by 
exempting some others from the requirement to comply—but often 
accommodations will impose costs on other citizens.  In the example of 
nighttime motorboating, allowing some to drive motorboats at night will
presumably impose some safety cost on those who want to row boats or 
swim in the water after dark.  If the accommodation is justified, the
distribution of benefits and burdens that it brings is fair to all who might 
be affected.
The fundamental argument against the claim that there is a right to 
moral freedom—to live in harmony with one’s conscientious judgments 
about how one ought to live—that ought to be legally enforced is that it 
wrongfully privileges one particular group of people who might claim to 
be unfortunately burdened by legal requirements.  Affirming a right to 
moral freedom elevates the claim to accommodation of the conscientious 
above the claims of others who might have more compelling claims to
accommodation.  Of course, affirming a right to moral freedom is
compatible with also affirming special rights for other special categories
of accommodation claims, such as those with disabilities.  However, 
assigning special privilege to the conscientious at least gives them
greater entitlement to accommodation than those with bread and butter 
burdens—those who simply find their important interests are especially
set back if they are not freed from the duty to comply with the law as 
currently drafted.  That is unfair because there is no reason to suppose 
that the conscientiously burdened generally have greater claims to be 
accommodated.  Entrenching a right to moral freedom or freedom of
conscience is also unfair to the diffuse interests of citizens who will be 
asked to shoulder extra burdens if accommodation to some is granted.
The interests of all affected, those who will suffer if not accommodated 
and those who will suffer if accommodation is granted, should be
weighed evenhandedly and given equal consideration in the determination
1024
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of the morally appropriate response to an accommodation claim.  The 
bare fact that “the law offends my conscience” does not generate a
special reason to put a thumb on the scale in favor of freeing me from
the duty of obedience. 
Reverting to the example of the nighttime motorboating prohibition,
suppose there are people who believe that driving motorboats at night is
morally required.  Their conscience tells them this is something they
must do.  It is always possible that people who are gripped by such
judgments perceive moral reasons that in fact show that either all people 
or some people in special circumstances morally ought to drive
motorboats at night.  If that is so, then of course there are good reasons 
to change the law.  The good reasons have nothing to do with the fact
that people subjectively believe that they morally ought to drive
motorboats at night.  The good reasons would be whatever reasons there 
really are that show nighttime motorboating to be morally special.
These are reasons anyone and everyone should recognize. 
To get back to the question at issue, we should recognize that the mere 
fact that I am of the opinion that I morally ought to drive motorboats at 
night does not have any force in showing that I am unfortunately
burdened, much less that I am unfortunately burdened to a greater degree
than others who lack such an opinion.  My subjective opinion by itself 
just cuts no ice here.  Suppose there are especially skilled drivers of 
motorboats who make a living by nighttime fishing and who need to be
able to move quickly across the bodies of water on which they fish. 
They have no moral beliefs that say they morally ought to be driving 
motorboats at night.  This is just a necessary means to carrying out their
livelihood.  I submit that in the example as described, it should be obvious 
that if anyone is to be accommodated, then it is the nonconscientious
people who engage in nighttime fishing who should be accommodated, 
not the conscientious objectors who have a moral vision that tells them
they morally ought to drive motorboats at night.
If you like, you can say that everyone who has a case for being
considered unfortunately burdened by a legal requirement has a right 
that her complaint should be considered on its merits along with others 
in any procedure that is used to determine who, if anyone, is really 
unfortunately burdened, and if so, whether there should be some legal 
accommodation for some of the unfortunately burdened, and if so, which 
complaints should be accommodated.  It would be a form of wrongful
discrimination to dismiss someone’s complaint from consideration on
 1025





















    
      
spurious grounds, such as that she is of a disfavored race or religion or 
gender.  I say it would be a form of wrongful discrimination to disfavor 
people’s complaints on the ground that they are not based on a claim of
conscientious judgment about how one ought to live.  The claimed right 
to moral freedom in effect stipulates that, in situations of this sort, all
those who are burdened by a legal requirement because it makes it more 
difficult for them to do what they judge they morally ought to do have a 
special claim to accommodation.  Acceptance of that claim tilts the 
playing field unfairly.  At worst, a consideration that in itself has no 
moral weight at all is being treated as though it had decisive moral weight. 
At the very least, a consideration that is just one type of reason among
others, one among many minnows swimming together, is being treated
as though it were specially morally privileged.
Discussing the normative basis for giving special legal protection to 
individuals when the free exercise of their religious way of life is
burdened by state action, Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. 
Sager arrive at a position that somewhat resembles the view I am taking 
about the normative basis for giving special legal protection to 
individuals when state action impedes their acting in conformity with 
their conscientious beliefs.  They deny that special priority should be
given to accommodating religious interests on the basis that religious
interests have exceptional value.  They propose the alternative that our 
concern in this domain should be to protect individuals from unfair 
discrimination.  In this spirit they affirm the “principle of equal regard,” 
which requires that “government treat the deep, religiously inspired 
concerns of minority religious believers with the same regard as that 
enjoyed by the deep concerns of citizens generally.”14  They are 
interpreting the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, but their idea generalizes. Just as 
adherents of minority religions may suffer discrimination and
mistreatment, those whose conscientious beliefs are in a minority may 
be prone to similar discrimination and mistreatment.  So, consider a 
version of their principle of equal regard that applies to deeply held 
conscientious judgments held by adherents of minority moral beliefs. 
Their principle of equal regard gives no special priority or privilege to 
claims for accommodation based on burdening of conscience, so in this 
sense, it is fully consistent with my suggestion that all who claim that
14. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: 
The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245,
1283 (1994). 
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they are unfortunately burdened by legal requirements have a right to 
consideration of their case for accommodation on its merits.
There is a difference between the Eisgruber-Sager principle of equal
regard and my proposed right to equal consideration.  Their principle 
specifies that, in ranking claims for accommodation, the relevant metric
is depth of concern.  Depth of concern might be interpreted as subjective 
intensity of concern.  Or perhaps a deep concern is one that is both
intensely felt and carefully considered by the person who has the
concern.  Either way, this way of ranking claims for accommodation is 
unsatisfactory.  Imagine that after careful consideration I form an extremely 
intense feeling or conviction that I ought to spend my life counting the
blades of courthouse lawns.  I claim that I am burdened by “stay off the 
grass” rules at courthouses.  Compare my claim for accommodation to 
that of a person who has no conscientious convictions or deeply felt
concerns of relevance, but happens to be allergic to concrete, so will
suffer great physical pain or comparable affliction if he is not allowed to 
walk on the grass instead of being required to stay on the cement
pathways when conducting business in the vicinity of courthouses.  To 
my mind the grass counter’s claim is outranked by that of the person 
prone to allergy—there is no contest.
The strength of a claim to be accommodated depends rather on a 
calculation of advantages and disadvantages.  What burdens will fall on 
other people if one is allowed not to comply with the law whose
impingement on oneself is challenging?  What is the aggregate disadvantage
of this burden, and how would it be distributed across persons?  To what 
extent would these burdens be lessened if people engaged in reasonable
coping behavior that they ought to undertake?  What burdens will fall on
one if one is required to comply with the law in question?  To what 
extent would these burdens be lessened if one engaged in reasonable
coping behavior that one ought to undertake?  A morally sensitive cost-
benefit calculation is needed, but I do not here try to stipulate the just 
distribution principles that should frame this analysis.
One principle that may play a role in shaping what counts as a just
distribution is that we ought to give extra weight to a claim for
accommodation to the degree that, if the claimants will suffer 
disadvantage if not exempted from the requirements of the law under 
challenge, being in position to suffer disadvantage in this way is an 
affliction that was beyond their power to control rather than the result of 
choices and behaviors for which they are reasonably held responsible.
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For example, if the law against jaywalking bears harshly on a person
because he suffers a disability that impedes his mobility and makes it
difficult for him to cross the street during the permitted time in which
the “Walk” sign is flashing, this is a ground for accommodation—say by
adding extra seconds to the “Walk” interval or by permitting him to
assert a right of way against oncoming traffic by brandishing a cane or 
using a wheelchair in the circumstances just described. 
In response, one might claim that we should assimilate claims of 
religious duty and claims of conscience to physical handicaps on the 
ground that the person who believes to be under a religious or moral 
duty will experience having no choice in the matter.  He cannot choose 
at will to cease believing a judgment about what he ought to do that is 
forced on him by his conscientious perception and reasoning.  Belief is 
not something we voluntarily bring about; it is something that happens 
to us.  So one might urge. 
But this assimilation of practical judgments about what one ought to 
do to unchosen handicaps is incorrect.  Although I cannot choose at will 
to believe against the dictates of conscience, the process by which my
conscientious beliefs form is one to which norms apply, which I may
fulfill or flout to varying degree.  I may carelessly neglect to consider 
evidence about facts that are material to my conscientious verdicts or 
neglect to consider relevant counterarguments or to listen to what those 
opposed to views to which I am inclined have to say on behalf of their 
views.  Belief is supposed to be responsive to evidence and argument, 
and I normally bear responsibility for bringing it about that I am
responsive in the appropriate ways to the best of my ability.
There is a further wrinkle here of some importance.  Suppose I am
unfortunately burdened by some law, for some reason, along with other
groups of persons, who are unfortunately burdened by this law for 
different types of reasons.  Suppose further that the legal regime is 
altered, so that some of those unfortunately burdened by the law are
exempted from the duty of compliance with it, but I am not.  Am I being
unfairly treated?  Let us stipulate that in a fair moral cost-benefit
analysis, the burden I suffer under the law and the costs to other people 
if the law is changed to lift this burden are morally comparable to the 
burdens and costs associated with the people for whom accommodation 
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is made.15  Am I then being treated unfairly by the shift in legal regime 
that accommodates some of the unfortunately burdened but not me? 
This question should be understood to be answerable only by holistic 
inquiry that does not consider just the law under review but the entire 
system of legal requirements and exemptions.  For it may well be the 
case that what might look like unfair treatment if one focuses on the 
benefits and burdens brought about by one law in isolation might appear 
benign if one broadens one’s view and considers the legal code as a 
whole.  Maybe you are being given special treatment in one set of legal 
provisions, but this just offsets the special treatment that I was given by 
some previous set of legal provisions addressing some quite different
matters.  Whether some of those unfortunately burdened by a particular 
law that is altered to accommodate some of the burdened are unfairly 
treated if they are excluded from the class of those accommodated in the
revised regime depends on the particulars of the case and also the entire
background of legal requirements with its aggregate distribution of 
benefits and burdens.
Of course, the $64,000 question⎯adjusting for inflation, perhaps we
should say, “the $64,000,000,000 question”⎯is what standard is the 
right one to employ in deciding questions about whether or not the 
overall burden of legal requirements bearing on citizens is fair or
unfair.16  This essay is not the proper occasion for discussing this
question, which in effect asks us to determine what is the morally correct
set of normative political principles.  I shall just venture the remark that
the desideratum that people should live their lives in conformity with
their own moral convictions has no special status here.  From the first-
person perspective, of course, the claim that I ought to do what is 
morally right is in practice, at the point of choice of action, not going to 
be distinguishable from the claim that I ought to do what my best
conscientious judgment tells me is morally right.17  But from the third-
15. Maybe the relevant idea of comparability is that the ratio of gain to one if the 
burden is lifted to costs imposed on others if the burden is lifted is the same for both
parties whose claims are being compared.
16. The $64,000 Question was a television game show broadcast by CBS from
June 1955 to June 1958.  The $64,000 Question, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki 
/The_$64,000_Question (last updated Nov. 8, 2010, 3:05 AM). 
17. The claim in the text is not exactly right.  When choosing what to do, I cannot 
in practice distinguish the act that I believe to be morally required from the act that is 
actually morally required, if any, in my circumstances.  However, I can, even at the
moment of choosing, entertain the idea that my current belief in this matter might in fact 
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person perspective, these claims are sharply distinguishable.  Suppose 
we start with the idea that, in deciding whom and when to accommodate, 
our guiding principle should be to bring it about that each person has a 
fair share of opportunity to lead a life that there is good and sufficient 
reason to find valuable.  Straightaway it emerges that there is no special
reason to give special priority to claims of conscience as such. 
Suppose the law as it currently stands in some jurisdiction prohibits 
the use of psychedelic drugs, such as mescaline, peyote, and LSD,
except for medical purposes controlled by a physician’s prescription. 
Three classes of people have a credible claim that they are specially
burdened by this law.  Some adhere to a religion whose weekend morning
rituals call for the ingestion of psychedelic drugs to secure spiritual 
states of mind.  Some other persons are committed to political activity to 
save the environment and are wont to gather in small groups on weekend 
mornings to ingest psychedelic drugs to facilitate feelings of solidarity
and community and a renewed will to work hard for environmental
causes. A third group of people is committed to surfing for its beauty 
and excellence and holds that gathering on weekend mornings to ingest 
psychedelic drugs prior to engaging in surfing transforms a merely 
enjoyable and fine activity into a sublime and moving experience.  If our
political morality gives special legal status to the claim for accommodation 
made by people whose free exercise of religion is burdened by legal 
requirements, then the first group is favored for accommodation over the 
latter two.  If our political morality gives special legal status to allowing 
people to live in accordance with their conscientious judgments about 
how they ought to live, then depending on the interpretation of this
norm, the first two groups will be favored for accommodation over the 
third.  My position is that both forms of legal privilege—the religious 
liberty privilege and the conscientious liberty privilege—involve wrongful 
discrimination.  They wrongfully favor some types of claims over others 
equally meritorious.
Besides any individual’s right to consideration of her claim for
accommodation on its merits, there is a more minimal right that also 
comes into play: a right that one’s claim for accommodation not be 
dismissed with hostile intent or treated perversely as though it were a 
reason against accommodation.  The duty to refrain from persecuting 
someone because she adheres to a religion that the majority of voters 
be incorrect, and this thought might have, and perhaps should have, a practical implication. 
For example, perhaps it would be reasonable for me to undertake further moral reflection 
or further efforts to discover empirical facts that bear on my proper choice of action. 
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dislike or because she affirms conscientious beliefs that are unpopular in 
her community is a peremptory duty, and detecting its violation can be 
done by examining a single law or public policy and does not require 
holistic appraisal of the ensemble of laws as does the right to
consideration.18 
IV. ACCOMMODATION BY EXEMPTION AND ACCOMMODATION BY 
ACCEPTANCE OF POSITIVE DUTY TO AID 
The discussion to this point construes the right to freedom of conscience
or moral freedom as a right to negative liberty—a right to be free from 
interference, especially coercive legal interference, with one’s living in 
harmony with one’s conscientious judgments about how one ought to
live.  I have argued against the existence of such a moral right.  However, 
this approach to the issue of accommodation misframes the issue.  The 
point of accommodating others when legal arrangements are especially
burdensome to them is not merely to protect negative liberty.  We should
be considering accommodation claims with a view to bring about a fair
distribution of positive freedom in the sense of real freedom.  One 
enjoys real freedom to do or gets X just in case one has an available
course of action such that if one chooses and carries out that course of 
action, one does X or gets X.19 
In light of this aim, sometimes accommodating others involves
accepting restrictions on our own liberty rather than exempting those we
seek to accommodate from compliance with laws and policies that 
restrict their freedom.  In other cases, adequate accommodation involves 
acceptance of positive duty to aid. 
There might be grounds for accepting restriction or another duty to 
aid, even if the goal were limited to ensuring that all had a fair share of
negative liberty to pursue their aims and projects.  For example, imagine
that we were considering laws that would prohibit private individuals 
from carrying guns or other dangerous weapons in public places.  Some 
Quakers and other religious pacifists, who refuse to employ violence or
18. For a plausible example of a state action that violated the minimal right against
discrimination as described in the text, see Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), which deals with a prohibition of ritual animal 
sacrifice that specially targeted Santeria religious practices.
19. On rights to capability as rights to positive freedom, see generally Amartya 
Sen, Rights and Agency, 11 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 14, 15–19 (1982). 
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the threat of violence as a way to resolve conflicts of interest among
persons, may well be specially burdened by nonpassage of a law
forbidding carrying weapons in public.  These people are barred by their 
conscience from opting to decide to carry weapons, even if the costs of 
not doing so become increasingly great as more and more people
become gun toters and being unarmed in public becomes increasingly
risky.  For the sake of the argument, assume that circumstances are such
that, setting aside the issue of due consideration for religious pacifists,
the case for prohibition of carrying weapons in public is outweighed by 
the considerations that oppose such a ban.  Perhaps many people have 
innocent reasons for carrying guns; they need to carry guns in public in 
order to hunt game or pursue some other legitimate project.  Quite aside 
from incentives to carry guns that arise from the arms-race worry that if
sufficient others are armed, one had better be armed as well, there are 
legitimate liberty interests in gun toting that just barely outweigh 
counterconsiderations.  However, throwing onto the scales the interests 
of the religious pacifists, who have interests in traveling freely in public 
without excessive risk of being bullied or shot by gun-wielding fellow 
citizens, the balance of moral reasons now swings the other way.  In this 
case we would be morally required to accommodate the interests of
Quakers and other religious pacifists whose interests in living a life with
normal freedoms and opportunities in harmony with their cherished 
values would be unduly burdened by nonpassage of the ban on carrying 
weapons in public.  In short, laws can be unfortunately or unduly 
burdensome on some people in virtue of the failure of the laws to restrict 
other people’s liberty as they ought.
This point has a bearing on a claim made by Michael Perry in support
of his proposal that the right to freedom of conscience or moral freedom 
should be made a legal right in every country.  He urges that when it acts 
beyond the sphere of protection of certain fundamental, uncontroversial 
interests, the government is likely to be wrong in its choices of law and
policy, and hence there is a general presumption in favor of letting
people act according to their conscience, when important protections of 
people’s fundamental interests are not in jeopardy.20  However, the 
government may be wrong, not only in establishing a law that ought not
to be established but also by failing to establish a law that ought to be
established.  The likelihood of error does not by itself make a case for
government inaction.  The government, however error prone, might 
wrongly restrict people’s liberty to do what they like in some domain but
 20. Perry, supra note 2, at 1006–08. 
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might equally wrongly fail to restrict people’s liberty to do what they
like in that domain.  A moral duty to accommodate conscience might 
just as well require the rest of us to accept restrictions of our liberty to 
benefit the conscientious as to require us to exempt the conscientious 
from legal restrictions on their liberty.  The same goes if there were no
such moral duty, rather a broader duty to consider on their merits and 
fairly all complaints by anyone to be specially burdened by current 
arrangements. 
V. THE SUPPOSED WRONG OF INDUCING PEOPLE TO ACT AGAINST 
THEIR CONSCIENTIOUS JUDGMENT 
A careful reader might object to the line of thought elaborated in this
essay on the ground that it doggedly insists on forcing a round peg into a 
square hole.  The essay treats claims of conscience as claims of personal 
interest, but these are fundamentally different.  A person who claims it is 
morally wrong to kill human beings in the course of waging war is not 
claiming that killing others disadvantages him and that he should be 
relieved of this disadvantage.  His demand on the state is not a claim of 
personal advantage at all. 
There is something to this complaint, but the truth in it casts doubt on
the claim that there is a moral right to freedom of conscience.  Such a
moral right necessarily imposes moral duties on the part of other agents 
to allow the individual to act in line with her conscientious judgment of 
what she morally ought to do, up to a point.  I do not see the case for
upholding any such duties.  There may be pragmatic reasons in some
cases not to force people to act against their conscience.  As Kent 
Greenawalt observes, “[F]utilely demanding that people do what they
regard as morally abhorrent is not the most productive use of rules and is 
bound to cause resentment among those whose conscience is burdened.”21 
When trying to force people to act against their conscience is
counterproductive, we probably should not do it, but this is fully
compatible with holding that when trying to force people to act against 
their conscience is not futile, making the effort may be morally
permissible and even morally required.  Moreover, causing resentment is
a consideration, not necessarily a trumping consideration.  So the 
 21. KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 199
(1988). 
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question becomes, when there are moral gains from seeking to induce 
people to act against their conscience by attaching penalties or other
disincentives to the doing of the conscientious act, is there some general
principled bar to doing this that the right to freedom of conscience 
exposes?
For simplicity, let us confine our attention to cases in which 
conscience issues in verdicts that a course of action forbidden by the 
community is morally required or that a course of action required by the 
community is morally prohibited.  In consulting her conscience, a person
seeks to use her faculties of practical and moral imagination as best she 
can to figure out what is morally right and wrong.  In carrying out this 
exercise and then deciding to act according to its verdict, her aim is not 
to do whatever she happens at the moment to believe is morally right 
and required.  Her aim is to conform her conduct to what is really
morally right and required.  To return to the example of conscientious
objection to participation in war, the person who refuses to fight in a war
on grounds of conscience believes that she owes it to other people— 
specifically the people who would be harmed by her participation in
war—that she not participate and not bring about harm to them, or 
impose on them a risk of harm, in this way.  Her deep underlying aim is 
to conform her conduct to the genuine moral requirements that bear on
her conduct, not per se to conform her conduct to her opinion about
these matters.  Loyalty to her own conscientious verdicts enters as a
means: she must believe that doing what, all things considered, she
believes to be morally right is the best means available to her to achieve 
her underlying aim of doing what is really morally right.  So she refuses 
to fight.
Suppose you have arrived at a different verdict: the war is just, and the
conscientious objector owes it to the people who will suffer injustice if
the just side fails to win the war that she participate with force to block 
this injustice from occurring.  If you are in a position to induce the 
conscientious objector to fight, you have moral relations not only to her 
but also to those affected by her refusal to fight.  Even if her
nonparticipation can be offset by enhanced participation by others, these 
others will then incur extra costs, including perhaps extra risks of being 
killed or maimed, and the result might then be a significantly unfair 
distribution of the burdens of waging a morally required just war.22 You 
22. There is also the possibility that attaching penalties to this act of conscientious 
objection, even if ineffective in altering the choice of this objector, may tend to deter
others from similar shirking. 
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might be right or wrong in the judgment you have reached to the effect
that the war effort is just and refusing to serve is morally wrong.  Just 
suppose that in this case you are right.23 You calculate correctly that you 
can achieve morally desirable results by threatening to impose a penalty 
on the conscientious objector unless she relents and joins the war effort. 
The question then becomes, is there a moral right to freedom of
conscience that in this situation imposes a duty on you—unless the 
stakes are very high—to allow the person to act according to her conscience
without suffering the contemplated penalty? 
Notice that there is an element of personal advantage wrapped up in 
the demand that we defer to conscience.  The threatened penalty directed
at the person about to act according to her conscience might do wrong 
by bringing it about that the person acts against her conscience or by
failing to deter and then bringing it about that the person’s condition 
assessed in self-interested terms is deliberately made worse by imposition of
penalty.  The person is fined, or sent to prison, or summarily executed. 
In all of these cases, she suffers personal disadvantage, and the claim of
freedom of conscience is that she should not be subject to this
disadvantage.  Having already considered this claim in Parts II and III of 
this essay and found it wanting, I am now considering the claim that 
there is a general duty to allow people to act in conformity with their
conscientious judgments—independently of whether or not those
judgments are true or likely to be true. 
If the threat succeeds in deterring the person from declining to 
participate in the war, is she forced to act against her will?  In an obvious
sense, yes: her considered will, absent the threatened penalty, is not to 
fight.  But insofar as her underlying aim is that her conduct should 
conform to what morality really requires, in the stipulated circumstances 
of this example, the threat if successful would be forcing her to do what 
in a deep sense she wills to do—to do the right thing.  The point holds
generally: whenever a person is not merely in love with her own opinion
or rigidly wedded to a dogma, but is exercising her practical reason with 
a view to discerning what is really right and doing what is really right, 
23. If you are incorrect, you do wrong to support the war effort and are wrong to
induce others to support it and participate in it.  However, the possibility of being wrong
does not tend to show that there is a right to moral freedom or freedom of conscience 
that should inhibit one from preventing a person from acting against her conscientious 
judgment, independently of whether or not the judgment is right or wrong. 
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then if she is wrong in fact, inducing her to act against her conscientious
judgment is inducing her to fulfill her deepest aim in her conscientious
project.  Notice also that this point does not depend on the size of the 
moral stakes.  The point holds just as much in small matters as in
momentous ones.  Suppose I am trying to discern the right division of a 
lollipop between two children, I make a mistake, and you induce me to
act against my conscientious judgment and divide the candy in a way I
think is wrong but that actually is right.  Again, my deep will to do what
is right has not been contravened.  So long as your act of inducement 
does not violate a proportionality requirement but is rather appropriate to
what is at stake, the fact that someone is of the mistaken sincere opinion 
that she ought not to do X is not in itself a reason not to induce her to do
X.  Hence, there is no moral right to freedom of conscience.
If instead the person does not have the deep aim of conforming her 
conduct to correct moral principles, but rather ultimately wants to do 
whatever he thinks is right to do at the moment of choice, or aims
ultimately to fulfill the actual conscientious opinion he holds now— 
independently of whether or not his opinion now is correct—or the like, 
then inducing the person to alter his course of action toward what is 
really right and away from what appears to him to be right cannot be
represented as helping the person to achieve what he fundamentally is
trying to achieve.  However, in these cases the person’s “conscientious”
aim is somewhat self-indulgent.  The person is attaching unwarranted 
attachment to his own opinion—correct or incorrect, reasonable or
unreasonable—about what he morally ought to do.  Having this type of 
self-indulgent aim does not generate a duty on the part of others to allow 
the person to act on the aim.24 
There is an epistemic dimension of the problem of the claimed right of
freedom of conscience to which I cannot do justice in this essay, but that
nonetheless merits mention.  Suppose you have decided that what is 
morally right is that I do X, and I have come to the opposed judgment 
that I ought not to do X.  Is it not morally arrogant for you to dismiss my
judgment and do what you can, within limits of reason, to bring it about 
that I act as you think best in the circumstances?  The answer is that, if 
time permits, you should examine the reasoning that leads me to my
judgment and assess it.  If it turns out that I have uncovered reasons your
24. There is an intermediate possibility.  One’s underlying aim may be both (1) to 
act in conformity with whatever one’s conscientious belief is at the moment of acting
and (2) to bring it about that one’s conscientious belief conforms to what is objectively
right.  The question then arises, when aim (2) is not fulfilled, does one still affirm aim 
(1)?  If so, then the animadversions in the text against self-indulgence still apply.
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initial thinking had overlooked, you should incorporate my reasons into
your own practical reasoning efforts.  Respect for my conscientious 
judgment should involve being disposed to make a good faith assessment of
my reasoning to that judgment.  But in the nature of the case, this 
assessment might turn out negative or positive.  The more you determine 
that my reasoning is confused, careless, or mistaken, or that I have failed
to apply myself with sufficient seriousness to the task of moral reasoning, or
that although I did the best I could, my practical reasoning abilities are 
subpar, the less you should in the end be swayed by the fact that you and 
I have arrived at opposed judgments.  The more my reasoning process 
looks to be sensible, the more doubt you should have in the certainty of 
your own judgment.  But what is at issue here is an aspect of moral 
respect owed to others that requires us to take seriously their practical
reasoning efforts, and this is a distinct matter from the claimed right to 
freedom of conscience.  Assuming we should accept a fallibilist perspective 
on our own reasoning and belief formation, we should acknowledge that 
even if we disagree with the conscientious verdict of another person and 
correctly notice that verdict is based on feeble reasoning and evident
lack of wisdom, it still remains the case that she might be right and we 
might be wrong.  But again, acceptance of fallibilism does not ground a 
right to freedom of conscience.
VI. FUTILITY? 
An advocate of the moral right to freedom of conscience might adduce 
the consideration that attempts by the state to induce people to act
against their conscientious judgments, if successful, will have the effect
of generally dampening people’s disposition to act conscientiously.  This
would be unfortunate, urges the advocate.  This appeal to consequences 
might form part of a case for assigning people a legal right to freedom of
conscience.
I make no attempt to assess the force of this speculative conjecture.  I
merely set another speculative conjecture against it.  This speculation, if 
correct, would weigh against the case for establishing a legal right to 
freedom of conscience.  Consider laws forbidding racial and ethnic
discrimination in such endeavors as hiring workers, admitting students 
for places in colleges and universities, and offering services to the public
for sale.  The law coercively regulates certain forms of behavior, but the 
aspirations of those who support such laws go beyond the regulation of 
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conduct.  The aim is to change the hearts and minds of men and women
and to bring it about that in time people will not only conform their 
conduct to the requirements of antidiscrimination law but will also do so 
willingly and cease to have racially charged motivations that lead them 
to want to do what the laws forbid.  To support the speculative hope that 
such changes might in time unfold, we might point to the expected
operation of a cognitive dissonance mechanism.25  Suppose initially I
have conscientious moral beliefs that oppose dealing with, for example, 
African-Americans on a footing of equality.  My conscientious beliefs 
impel me to varieties of conduct the law forbids.  If I generally submit to
the law and follow its dictates in action, one psychological effect might 
be that because (1) I regard myself as a nice, decent, rational person and 
(2) I am not mistreating African-Americans but treating them as equals;
therefore, (3) it probably is the case that these people do not deserve
mistreatment and in fact deserve to be treated as equals.  In short,
inducing people to act against their conscientious beliefs may over time 
alter their conscientious beliefs.
The cognitive dissonance mechanism is morally blind.  To the extent
that it is effective, it can wean people away from their current beliefs and
toward the beliefs that chime in with the behaviors that people are being
induced to follow against their will, whether the latter beliefs are good,
bad, or ugly.  The mechanism is just as useful for bringing it about that 
people are led to embrace bad moral beliefs as good ones.  I am
highlighting the later possibility.
VII. PRACTICALITY
Even if we were to concede—against the arguments adduced in this 
essay—that there is a moral right to freedom of conscience, it might 
seem that there is an obvious knockdown argument against establishing 
this moral right as an enforceable legal right.  Any legal entrenchment of
a broad right to freedom of conscience would be bound to have 
disastrous incentive effects—so it might be thought.  Suppose that every 
law that a society enacts contains a proviso to the effect that the 
requirements of this law do not apply to anyone who is conscientiously
opposed to obedience to them.  Such a proviso would invite anyone who 
finds conformity to the law not to his liking to declare himself a 
conscientious objector.  The same problem arises in a weakened form if
there is a standing legal procedure that allows anyone to claim that he
25. See generally ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 190–200 (Worth Publishers
9th ed. 2004) (1972). 
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should be exempted from the requirement of obedience to any provision 
of law to which he is conscientiously opposed, the procedure being set to
accede to any such sincere request unless the state has a significant
interest in declining to exempt the individual from this particular burden.
Any state policy that provides significant benefits to anyone whose 
conscientious beliefs oppose obedience to a given law inevitably tempts 
citizens to feign conscientious objector status or to convince themselves 
that they in fact have the conscientious beliefs that would entitle them to
the benefits.  So no such policy can be part of a stable, administrable,
just system of law.  So runs the argument from practicality. 
I do not endorse the argument from practicality.  It ignores the 
possibility that legal arrangements may be established that do not give 
people perverse incentives to feign or adopt conscientious objector 
beliefs.  Consider conscientious objection to participation in war.  If
there are alternative forms of national service that will satisfy the varieties 
of conscientious objection to military service and that are roughly
equally useful for advancing significantly morally worthy causes and
that are just as dangerous or overall disadvantageous as military service, 
then the government can avoid coercing anyone to fight in wars against 
her conscience by setting up alternative forms of national service and 
giving all those subject to conscription into military service the option of 
participating in some alternative form of national service.  In this way,
no one who is merely seeking relief from danger or inconvenience will 
be given any incentive to feign or change beliefs just to avoid the 
inconvenience. 
The example generalizes.  In principle, one can craft laws, including 
exemption provisos, that allow citizens to avoid acting against their
consciences without making it more advantageous to be such a
conscientious objector than to be a citizen who complies with the law.
So one might respond to the argument from practicality by affirming that 
there should be a legal right to freedom of conscience that is limited to
situations in which the enforcement of the right is feasible in the sense
that the enforcement mechanism does not provide any citizens perverse
incentives. 
A more robust response to the argument from practicality is also
available.  If there is a moral right to freedom of conscience—recall that
in this section we are conceding arguendo that there is such a moral 
right—then ex hypothesi establishing legal arrangements that accord this 
moral right to citizens is a morally worthy aim, and we should be willing 
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to incur some costs to achieve it.  These costs may involve some losses
of efficiency in pursuing other social goals.  Even in circumstances in
which one cannot in practice respect the right to freedom of conscience 
without generating some incidental benefits for those who are enabled to
live in harmony with their conscientious beliefs and hence without
generating some perverse incentives, up to a point, swallowing these 
costs may be an acceptable price to pay in exchange for achieving the 
fulfillment of people’s rights to freedom of conscience. 
My argument in this essay denies that there is a moral right to freedom 
of conscience.  I do not deny that, if there were such a right, there would 
be a strong case for making it a legal right as well.  Generally speaking, 
the law should be set to protect people’s significant moral rights.  But if 
there is no moral right to freedom of conscience or moral freedom,
anyone who urges that a legal right to this freedom should be established 
would need to advance some special considerations.  I do not see any
such considerations on the horizon.
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